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PREGNANT EMPLOYEES IS NOT
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act2
(PDA) to establish clearly that sexual discrimination includes discrimi-
nation based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
Nine years later, in California Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra,3
the United States Supreme Court held that the PDA does not prohibit
employment practices that favor pregnant women.4 Guerra could have
opened the floodgates for the preferential treatment of pregnant
employees. Yet, the Sixth Circuit decision in Harness v. Hartz
Mountain Corp.5 is the only case thus far in which a court relies upon
Guerra in approving a more favorable maternity leave policy than that
granted to male employees suffering from other similar, temporary
disabilities. This Note will discuss the decisional background of Title
VII sexual discrimination and the PDA. It will also explain the Harness
decision and discuss its implications on future PDA disputes.
1. 877 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1989).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides
in pertinent part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
3. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
4. Id. at 286-88.
5. 877 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1989).
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I. DECISIONAL BACKGROUND OF PREGNANCY
DIsCRIMINATION BEFORE HARNESS
Historically, plaintiffs brought pregnancy discrimination suits
under two basic theories: rights as guaranteed by equal protection and
due process6 and rights protecting against sexual discrimination as
guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Of the two
theories, Title VII redress proved the most common.' This was due
partially to the requirement that a plaintiff show both state action9 and
a discriminatory purpose or intent on behalf of the employer ° to
prevail in the equal protection/due process context. Yet, because
situations existed in which Title VII was inapplicable as a remedial
measure, courts developed basic modes of analysis in some early
constitutional cases."
In Geduldig v. Aiello,12 the United States Supreme Court held that
disability plans which exclude disability resulting from normal
pregnancy from coverage do not violate the equal protection clause.
13
The court reasoned that such a disability plan does "not discriminate
with respect to the persons or groups which are eligible for...
protection under the [disability] program."'4 It stated that pregnancy-
based classifications were not discriminatory against women. 6 In a
footnote, the Court explained that such classifications divided potential
recipients into two groups: pregnant women and non-pregnant persons,
with the latter group including members of both sexes.' Thus, there
existed no gender-based discrimination. Furthermore, because the
exclusion of normal pregnancy disability simply was "underinclusive" in
6. See Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination
Amendment to Title VII: Ignoring Congressional Intent, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 591,
592-96 (1982).
7. Id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-e6 (1982),
generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin by any employer with fifteen or more employees.
8. Wald, supra note 6, at 593.
9. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (fourteenth amendment
requires state action).
10. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,281 (1979) (plaintiff must
demonstrate that the law "reflects a purpose to discriminate on the basis of
sex").
11. See infra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
12. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
13. Id. at 494-97.
14. Id. at 494.
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classification, the court applied a "rational relation" test, rather than
the more stringent "suspect class" test.'7 With that analysis, the Court
easily found no violation of the equal protection clause.'
8
Two years later in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,19 the United
States Supreme Court clarified any ambiguity concerning the impact of
Title VII on pregnancy-based discrimination. In Gilbert, female
employees were denied disability benefits under their employer's
disability plan while they were absent from work becuase of pregnan-
cy.20 They brought an action alleging discrimination in violation of
Title VII.2' The Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related
disabilities was not a violation of Title VII unless there was an
indication that the exclusion was a pretext for discriminating against
women.' The Court stated that a prima facie violation of Title VII
exists "upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan or
classification is to discriminate against members of one class or
another."' In finding that the women plaintiffs did not establish such
an effect, the Court reiterated the reasoning in Geduldig by concluding
that "underinclusiveness" is not necessarily gender-based discrimina-
tion.24 Additionally, the Court stated that the plan "is nothing more
than an insurance package, which covers some risks, but excludes
others."' Thus, once again the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion
of pregnancy-related disabilities from employers' disability plans despite
a constitutional challenge.
In direct response to the Supreme Court's decisions,26 and, more
specifically, to overrule the decision in Gilbert,' Congress enacted the
17. Id. at 494-96.
18. Id. at 494-97.
19. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
20. Id. at 129.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 136. To reach this holding, the Court applied a disparate impact
analysis. Such analysis applies when an otherwise facially neutral policy, has
a disproportionate impact on a group protected by Title VII. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137.
24. Id. at 138-39.
25. Id. at 138.
26. H.R. REP. No. 948,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4749, 4751-52.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4749,4750-51 (the committee formally recognized
that the dissenting Justices in Gilbert correctly interpreted the Act).
It was recognized that the Gilbert majority had "ignored the congressional
intent in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act-that intent was to protect all
individuals from unjust employment discrimination, including pregnant
1990]
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PDA in 1978.' The PDA acts as a supplement to the definitional
section of Title VII by declaring pregnancy-related discrimination as
discrimination "on the basis of sex."' The Act clarifies that "distinc-
tions based on pregnancy are per se sex discrimination violations of Title
VII."3 In effect, the PDA entitles pregnant women to the same
disability benefits as men."
While the language of the PDA appeared clear and unambiguous,
the statute expressly mandated only equal treatment.32 Thus, the
question whether the PDA required, or even allowed, preferential
treatment to be afforded pregnant employees remained unanswered--
until the Supreme Court decision in California Federal Savings & Loan
Association v. Guerra.3
In Guerra, the issue presented was whether Title VII, as amended
by the PDA, preempted a California statute' requiring employers to
provide leave and re-instatement to pregnant employees. The issue
-arose when a female employee was denied re-instatement upon
returning from pregnancy disability leave.' The employee filed a
complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing,
alleging that her employer, California Federal Savings and Loan
Association (Cal Fed), was in violation of section 12,945(b)(2) of the Fair
workers." 123 CONG. REc. 7539 (1977) (Senator Williams' introduction of the
bill), reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMM'N OF LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES,
96TH CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINA-
TION ACT OF 1978 2 (1979).
28. For text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, see supra note 2.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
30. H.R. REP. No. 948,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4749, 4751.
31. However, it is also clear that employers who are not presently providing
temporary disability requirements to any workers are not required to begin
providing benefits to pregnant employees. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 948, supra
note 26, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4751.
32. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4751.
33. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
34. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,945(b)(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). California's
Fair Employment and Housing Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona
fide occupational qualification... [flor any employer to refuse to allow
a female employee affected by pregnancy... [tlo take a leave on
account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time.... Reasonable
period of time means that period during which the female employee
is disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions ....
35. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 278-79.
78 [Vol. 55
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Employment and Housing Act.' In response, Cal Fed brought an
action seeking a declaratory judgment that section 12,945(b)(2) was
inconsistent with and preempted by the PDA.
Of the ways in which a federal law may preempt a state law,38 the
United States Supreme Court found that in this case the federal law
would preempt state law only if the state law was in actual conflict with
the federal law.39 The Court further noted that sections 708 and 1104
of the Civil Rights Act "severely limit[ed] Title VII's preemptive
effect., 40  Thus, the Court recognized that the PDA preempts only
those state laws which either require or permit employers to violate
Title VII or those which are inconsistent with the purposes of the
statUte.
41
In applying this standard to section 12,945(b)(2), the Court
concentrated on states' rights. Specifically, the issue was whether the
PDA prohibited the states from requiring employers to re-instate
pregnant workers, with no regard given to their policy for disabled
workers generally.42  The Court reasoned that "if Congress had
36. Id. at 278. An employer violates section 12,945(b)(2) if he or she refuses
to allow an employee to take a reasonable pregnancy leave, not to exceed four
months. Id. at 275 n.1.
37. Id at 279. For the text of section 12,945(b)(2) of the FEHA see supra
note 34. For the text of the PDA, see supra note 2.
38. Federal law may pre-empt state law in three ways:
1) Congress may pre-empt by stating so expressly;
2) Congress may pre-empt "impliedly" by allowing no room for
supplementary state regulation; and
3) federal law will pre-empt state law when it is in conflict with the
federal law.
Id. at 280-81; see Jones v. Roth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (express pre-
emption); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (implied pre-
emption).
39. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281.
40. Id at 282. Section 708 of Title VII provides that nothing in Title VII
exempts any person from liability or duty from any state laws except for "such
law[s] which purport to require or permit the doing of any act which would be
an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7
(1982). Section 1104 of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in
which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the
same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed
as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is
inconsistent with any purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1982).
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intended to prohibit preferential treatment [of pregnant employees], it
would have been the height of understatement to say only that the
legislation would not require such conduct."43 The Court noted further
that it is ridiculous to think that Congress, if in fact its intent was to
prohibit preferential treatment, would have instead limited its extensive
discussion only to its intent not to require such treatment." Further-
more, the Court asserted that the purpose of the PDA was to establish
a minimum level of pregnancy benefits rather than a maximum level. 5
Thus, section 12,945(b)(2) was not contrary to the purposes of the PDA
in that the statute did not compel employers to treat pregnant workers
preferentially; the statute merely provided the minimum benefits that
employers must provide to their pregnant workers.46 The employer
was free to provide similar benefits to male employees and, thus, was
not compelled by state law to violate federal law. 7 Since compliance
with both the state statute and the PDA was possible, the Court held
that preemption of the state law was not necessary.41 More important-
ly, however, Guerra clearly established that the PDA does not prohibit
employment practices that favor pregnant women.
Commentators have stated that the impact of the Guerra decision
on pregnancy discrimination is yet to be seen.4 9 Two years after the
Guerra decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its two-to-one
decision in Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp.,6° decided the first case
in which Guerra is cited in approving a more favorable maternity leave
policy.
III. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp.,51 a divided Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an employer did not violate a Kentucky
law52 identical to the PDA by granting female employees more
43. Id. at 287.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 285.
46. Id. at 291.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 292.
49. See Note, Title Vii's Limited Preemptive Effect Allows State Laws
Mandating Pregnancy Leave and Reinstatement, 9 U. ARIZ. L. REV. 669, 680.81
(1987).
50. 877 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1989).
51. 877 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1989).
52. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.030(6) (Michie 1983). This statute is
Kentucky's statutory counterpart to the federal PDA. For the text of the PDA,
see supra note 2.
740 [Vol. 55
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/3
PREGNANT EMPLOYEES
extensive unpaid maternity leave than male employees who were
suffering from other disabilities.5
3
In Harness, a male employer of Hartz Mountain Corp., Bill
Harness, brought suit against Hartz alleging reverse discrimination in
violation of sections 344.030(6)' and 344.040(1) of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes.6 The dispute arose when Harness suffered a heart
attack 7 and was placed on unpaid leave pursuant to company
policy.68 The policy, applicable to illness or non-work injury only,
provided for an initial thirty-day leave with two additional thirty-day
extensions. This plan allowed a maximum leave of absence of ninety
days.5 9 The company granted Harness the two thirty-day extensions,
but he was unable to return to work within the ninety-day maximum
allowance.' In accordance with company policy, Hartz considered
Harness resigned as of the ninety-day expiration date,61 and later
refused to re-instate Harness upon his healthy return.6 2
Based on these facts, Harness filed suit.6 He argued that Hartz'
alternative leave policy, which was specifically for maternity-related
disabilities, granted more favorable treatment to pregnant employees,
thus discriminating against male employees." Hartz' maternity leave
policy provided for an initial ninety-day leave, coupled with a possible
two-year extension, as compared to the ninety-day maximum leave
allowed for other disabilities. Upon cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court granted the motion in favor of Hartz.w
In a two-to-one ruling, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.67
The Court of Appeals stated that the Guerra decision established that
the federal PDA allows more favorable treatment of employees taking
53. Harness, 877 F.2d at 1310.
54. See supra note 52 for explanation of section 344.030(6).
55. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.040(1) (Michie 1983). A violation of this
statute occurs when an employer discriminates against an employee on the basis
of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or age. Id









65. Id. at 1308-09.
66. Id. at 1309.
67. Id at 1310.
1990]
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leave for pregnancy-related conditions.m Since no Kentucky state
court had construed the state law, which was identical to the PDA, any
differently the Sixth Circuit said Guerra was persuasive authority that
Hartz did not discriminate by granting more liberal leave for "materni-
ty-related reasons."6 9 The court stated that "[s]ince the Guerra Court
held.., that such preferential treatment is permissible under the PDA,
it follows that the preferential treatment accorded pregnant employees
under the Hartz policy is permissible under [the Kentucky
statute]..o
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Nelson urged that the court follow the
plain language of the Kentucky law, and he provided several arguments
supporting his contention.7 ' First, he emphasized that the statute is
unambiguous in mandating that pregnant employees "be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes... as other persons not so
affected but similar in tleir ability or inability to work, and [that]
nothing in this section shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.0
2
Judge Nelson noted that by ignoring such an express mandate, the
judges have, in effect, violated the law themselves by abusing their
power.73 He argued that precedent will be deemed trivial if judges use
their power to amend unambiguous statutory text solely because it may
result in consequences uncontemplated by its makers. 74 Furthermore,
Judge Nelson quoted Chief Justice Burger's statement that "[we should]
beware the 'good result,' achieved by judicially unauthorized or
intellectually dishonest means on the appealing notion that the
desirable ends justify the improper judicial means.7 5
Second, Judge Nelson criticized the approach used by the Guerra
Court in concluding that the PDA does not intend to mean what it
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1309. The Court cites to Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v.
Commonwealth, 586 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) ("The Kentucky
statute... is ... identical to the corresponding section of the... Civil Rights
Act .... Therefore,... Supreme Court decisions regarding the federal provisions
are most persuasive, if not controlling, in interpreting the Kentucky statute.").
70. Harness, 877 F.2d at 1310.
71. Id. at 1310-11 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
72. Id. It is most apparent that Judge Nelson agrees with Justice White's
dissenting opinion in Guerra. Justice White states that the language of the
identical federal provision "could not be clearer [and thus] leaves no room for
[the] preferential treatment of pregnant workers." Guerra, 479 U.S. at 297
(White, J., dissenting).
73. Harness, 877 F.2d at 1312 (citing B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 129 (1921)).
74. I&
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aplears literally to say.76 The Guerra Court cited the familiar rule
that "'a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers. '77  Judge Nelson firmly rejected the application of that
rule.' He explained that such a rule teaches judges that it is not
necessary to follow the express mandate of a statute if they believe that
under the circumstances the legislature would have acted differently
upon more careful thought.79 According to Judge Nelson, if such were
the case, the roles of the judiciary and the legislature would become
intertwined, and judges are not in the proper position to adopt a
legislative function so as to change an unambiguous statute.8 0
Third, while acknowledging Guerra as the most persuasive
authority, Judge Nelson stressed that the real issue the court should
have resolved was the legislative intent behind the Kentucky statute.
8
'
He substantiated this conclusion by emphasizing that while Guerra
allows (but does not compel) a state to provide for the preferential
treatment of pregnant employees, the Supreme Court did not decide
Guerra until well after the Kentucky statute was enacted.8 2 Therefore,
the court should have looked solely to the purposes and intentions of the
Kentucky legislature in enacting the statute.8 3 Summarily, he argued
that the general purpose of the Kentucky legislature was to safeguard
all individuals from sex discrimination, and not just those individuals
who are pregnant.84
Fourth, Judge Nelson stressed that according to Kentucky case law,
unless the plain reading would result in an "absurd" or "wholly
unreasonable conclusion," the court should give effect to the plain words
of the Kentucky statute.8 " Thus, the application of this standard
would have resulted in the obvious dismissal of the contention that the
statute results in an "absurd" or "wholly unreasonable conclusion." As
76. Id at 1311.
77. Id (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,
459 (1892)).
78. Id. at 1312.
79. Id.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
81. Harness, 877 F.2d at 1312-13.
82. Id. at 1312.
83. Id at 1313.
84. Id; see also supra note 27 (intent in enacting Title VII, upon which the
Kentucky statute is based, was to protect all individuals from unjust employ-
ment discrimination).
85. Harness, 877 F.2d at 1313 (citing Bailey v. Reeves, 662 S.W.2d 832 (Ky.
1984)).
9
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Judge Nelson pointed out, what judge could hold in good conscience that
equal treatment is "absurd or wholly unreasonable?" 6
Last, Judge Nelson stressed that it is the job of the legislators to
change a statute which they feel is unjust.8 7 That is precisely what
Congress did after Gilbert when it realized that the Civil Rights Act did
not say what Congress had intended it to say.' The congressional
response was the enactment of the PDA.89 Judge Nelson scolded the
court for taking such a responsibility upon themselves by saying,
"Kentucky legislators get paid for that sort of thing. Kentucky judges
do not."9° To him, the court lost sight of its assigned judicial role."
IV. ANALYSIS
Although he was alone in his dissent, Judge Nelson was correct in
his approach in Harness. He criticized the court's inquiry into the
legislative history of the statute beyond the express, unambiguous
language of the law.92 The clause "shall be treated the same" arguably
mandates that disparate treatment of employees, whatever their
temporary disability, is prohibited by the Kentucky statute. Further,
the Kentucky statute provides "nothing in this section [of the statute]
shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. " " The intent of the Kentucky
legislature is clear: to protect all individuals from sexual discrimina-
tion.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals held that legislative history
mandates an opposite conclusion. In doing so, the court overstepped its
boundaries and encroached upon the legislative function. The possible
impact of this encroachment is two-fold. First, it casts doubt upon
whether a legislature can ever confidently draft a statute. Surely a
statute that provides expressly that "nothing shall be interpreted to
permit otherwise" is clear in its meaning. Yet, the Harness court chose
to overlook this express, unambiguous language. What more can a
legislature do? The hands of the legislature are tied; they must only
hope that courts respect the unambiguous statutory language which






91. Id at 1313-14.
92. See supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
93. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.030(6) (Michie 1983). For the text of the
PDA, which is identical to section 344.030(6), see supra note 2.
744 [Vol. 55
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Second, by circumventing the express language of the statute, the
Harness court made possible discriminatory practices against employees
suffering from non-pregnancy disabilities. Since it is conceivable that
employers will buckle under societal pressure and provide preferential
treatment for female employees,' it follows that courts and legislators
will find themselves consumed in a vicious circle. That is, after
attempting to achieve equality of opportunity for females by allowing
preferential treatment, they may then find themselves discriminating
against males. This constant circular remedying of disparate treatment
could continue forever.
A similar controversy to the dispute in Kentucky could arise in
Missouri. Section 213.055(1) of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides
that an employer will be in violation of the section if he or she discrimi-
nates on the basis of sex against an employee with respect to employ-
ment privileges.95 Additionally, Missouri has no statutory definition
of the term "on the basis of sex" as did Kentucky.9 Furthermore,
section 213.101 states that the provisions "shall be construed to
accomplish the purpose thereof."97
Thus, with that statutory background, Missouri legislators may find
themselves in the same position as did the Kentucky legislators. That
is, a Missouri court could conceivably follow the Guerra and Harness
logic and allow the preferential treatment of female employees,
regardless of the express language of sections 213.055(1) and 213.10198
mandating equal treatment. State legislatures, including Missouri, may
find themselves not only helpless with regard to their courts' interpreta-
tions of their respective anti-discrimination statutes, but also confronted
with results they may never have intended.9
94. Employers may also be pressured to provide preferential treatment to
avoid the possibility of a judicially-compelled affirmative action plan. Yet,
although employers may be wary of the negative connotations of such an
enactment, it may serve as a defense against a subsequent discrimination
allegation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1982).
95. Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.055(1) (1986).
96. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
97. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.101 (1986).
98. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text for an explanation of
sections 213.101 and 213.055.
99. This apparently has caught the attention of some Missouri legislators.
At the time of this writing, Senator Jay Nixon had proposed to the Missouri
legislature a bill which would require that a three-month mandatory maternity
leave be granted to female employees. This proposal, however, has been
weakened by amendments. The current proposal is to simply adopt the
language of the federal Pregnancy Disability Act, which requires no mandatory
leave. S. 542, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1990).
11
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Not only will the decision in Harness have an impact on future
statutory interpretation and drafting, it also will have a detrimental
societal impact. While some may argue that this decision is a step
forward for women in business, in reality this decision inures to no one's
benefit. First, the court's interpretation in Harness simply perpetuates
the myth that women need or desire special treatment. On the
contrary, the women's movement has directed its efforts toward only
equal treatment, not preferential treatment. As a result, this decision
may cause resentment among the workforce: men who feel discriminat-
ed against for the lack of similar paternity benefits and the preferential
treatment afforded to their female counterparts; females who are unable
to take advantage of such preferential treatment because they choose to
adopt or are otherwise unable to become pregnant; and females who
simply resent the granting of preferential treatment. This resentment
and conflict among an employee's workforce may have serious effects
upon worker morale, productivity, and job turnover, all of which may
lead to a detrimental economic impact on the employer's business.
Second, in approving preferential treatment for pregnant employ-
ees, Harness may lead legislatures to bow to societal pressure and
expressly provide for preferential treatment in state statutes. This, too,
could be devastating to employers. Employers may be less likely to hire
females because they are forced to provide better health benefits than
those benefits provided for males. Such practices, although motivated
by economics rather than discriminatory intent, will still provide a
cause of action for sex discrimination for females who are not hired.
Furthermore, smaller companies with limited capital and resources may
find themselves unable to compete against the larger corporations in the
market because of such mandatory benefit laws. This would be true
especially for those smaller companies who have offices or warehouses
in more than one state, because attempts to comply with various
statutes mandating lengthy leaves or special benefits may result in
financial difficulties and a subsequent inability to continue operating.
Thus, although the decision may have attempted to represent a good
faith effort to remedy past discrimination of women, that effort is
misplaced in that Harness results only in consequences that are adverse
not only to men and employers, but to females as well.
In addition to Judge Nelson's criticism of the use of legislative
history and the adverse societal impact of Harness, the approach in the
dissent was correct in another regard. There is uncertainty and
confusion surrounding both the PDA and similar state anti-discrimina-
tion pregnancy statutes. Although some argue that Guerra is too
expansive, others argue that a facial requirement of absolute parity of
[Vol. 55
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treatment is too restrictive."° Judge Nelson provides a middle ground
approach that may satisfy both sides of the spectrum. It must be
remembered that while Guerra allows preferential treatment for
pregnant employees, it does not compel such disparate treatment.10 1
Judge Nelson argues that, given an unambiguous, facially-neutral
statute, a court must remember its proper role in the judicial system
and it must not abuse its powers by acting legislatively.0 2 The
judiciary's responsibilities do not include changing the application of the
statute because it behooves them to do so. 10 3 Judge Nelson does not
urge the express prohibition of preferential treatment for pregnant
employees. He simply emphasizes that the Kentucky legislators are the
proper parties to make the decision of whether to allow such treat-
ment.'0 Thus, the expansiveness of Guerra that incites apprehension
in so many may be tempered by legislative action. This solution
satisfies the two conflicting viewpoints; yet, it will be a viable solution
only if the judiciary adheres to its proper function and respects the
legislature. Until the courts do so, the confusion surrounding the PDA
and the impact of Harness will persist.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court in Guerra held that the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not preempt state laws which allow
the preferential treatment of pregnant employees regarding disability
benefits. The reaction to the decision was mixed, and the implications
of the decision were unknown. One author noted that the decision
would provide an opportunity for state legislatures to explicitly provide
for preferential treatment.0 5 If so, the effect would be to burden
small businesses in their attempts to comply with statutes mandating
such lengthy leaves.' One thing that remains, however, is the
potential for a flood of state laws preferentially treating women.
In Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp., the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals cited to Guerra in the first case to uphold a leave policy
affording the preferential treatment of pregnant employees. It has
taken two years for a court to cite Guerra for that distinct proposition
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and with this decision comes controversy. Although construed as an
attempt to compensate women for past discrimination in the work place
by improving employment opportunities through Title VII, Harness may
have taken one step too far. Unfortunately, it has the effect of ratifying
discriminatory practices against those in the work force who suffer from
disabilities other than pregnancy. As Judge Nelson noted in his dissent,
the Kentucky statute, which is identical to the PDA, mandates that
"[w]omen... shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes."' °7 Yet, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Harness has
circumvented the express language of the state law identical to the PDA
and approved such favorable treatment. Thus, while the potential for
favorable treatment of pregnant employees arose after Guerra, with the
decision in Harness it seems as if the full impact of Guerra is just
beginning to surface.
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